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Chapter 6  CONCLUSION 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This final chapter discusses the summary of research, implications of the study to 
theory, stakeholders and researchers. Subsequently, followed by limitations of research 
and suggestion for future research. 
 
6.1 Summary of Research 
The objectives of the study are to examine the types of audit committee experts that are 
appropriate for the Malaysian corporate governance scenario, and to investigate the 
relationship between audit committee experts and financial reporting quality. The study 
applies agency theory (AT), resource dependence theory (RDT) and behavioural 
decision theory (BDT), to examine the audit committee expertise with financial 
reporting quality. The theories provide the research with an empirical implications or 
hypotheses that can be investigated by empirical testing. The audit committee expertise 
is measured by academic, and professional qualification and experiences in managerial 
position, which were developed from a well designed measurement system that are 
supported by the behavioural decision theory and experts literature. According to the 
agency theory, separation between the owner and manager, that resulted in the 
separation between ownership and control would subsequently leads to the agency 
costs, such as litigations costs due to fraud cases, or firms‟ bad performances. In this 
study, the agent is represented by the board of directors, i.e. audit committee members, 
while the shareholders are the principals.  
 
Audit committees are viewed as monitoring devices that are used to prevent 
opportunitistic behaviours and strengthen the quality of financial reporting, hence to 
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mitigate the agency conflicts between preparers of financial statements and outside 
shareholders. Furthermore, in a resource dependence theory, audit committee is also 
viewed as directors that link the firm with external resources, to bring in capital such as 
expertise and experience. These expertise and experience are identified as criterias for 
experts from the behavioural decision theory. Then, after key variables of interest and 
other influential factors are established, dependent variables and independent variables 
are identified to give a better impression of the breadth of the study. Thus helps to 
answer the first research question related to the types of expertise that are suitable for 
the Malaysian corporate governance context, i.e. what will be the appropriate measure 
of audit committee experts that suits the Malaysian corporate governance practices? 
And this is answered by the three fundamentals criteria established from the behavioural 
decision theory namely; professional qualification, academic qualification and 
managerial experiences. 
 
From the formulated theories, the study continues with statistical techniques to validate 
the hypotheses. The techniques are used to answer the second research question on the 
relationship of the audit committee expertise and financial reporting quality. Firstly, 
financial reporting quality is proxied by two different features, namely fraudulent 
financial reporting and earnings management. As suggested from prior literatures in 
fraud, fraud firms are selected from the Securities Commissions Announcements and 
Enforcements in their 2001 to 2008 Annual Reports by way of content analysis. A 
matched pair sampling is carried out for the sampling, consistent with prior studies. 
However, samples for earnings management are taken from recent data for year 2008 of 
top 300 listed companies based on prior year market capitalisation. As much as 267 
companies are included for the collection of data, and year 2008 is considered because 
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in October 2007,  latest amendments were made on the MCCG. Similarly, data is 
collected by content analysis. 
 
Following that, a logistic regression analysis is performed for the fraud‟s sample, while 
a linear multivariate analysis is utilised for the earnings management‟s sample. In the 
fraud‟s sample, management ownership and accounting affiliated directors, are 
significant and support the hypothesis (H1) that states, firms with higher proportion of 
audit committee members with professional accounting affiliations, are less likely to 
experience fraudulent financial reporting. Similarly, the larger the number of 
management ownership, the less likely are the incidence of fraudulent financial 
reporting. The negative coefficients for both variables suggest that, with larger 
percentage of ownership by directors, and higher proportion of accounting affiliated 
audit committees, the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting is lower.  
 
Accounting affiliated audit committees are also documented to be prevalent in the 
association with discretionary accruals as second proxy to financial reporting quality. 
Hence, from both measure of proxies, accounting affiliated audit committee experts, is 
an important determinant to financial reporting quality. Thus confirms the application of 
the three theories and provide answers to the study‟s second research question, i.e. is 
there a relationship between these audit committees experts and financial reporting 
quality? Accounting affiliated audit committees have a negative relationship with 
financial reporting quality, suggesting that these experts can help to reduce the 
incidence of fraudulent financial reporting and lowers the magnitude of earnings 
management. The larger the number of these experts, the lower the likelihood of 
fraudulent financial reporting, and the lower the magnitude of earnings management. 
Consequently improve the quality of financial reporting. These results also confirm the 
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resource dependence theory on audit committee expertise as the resource provider 
where, the resources are identified as skill, knowledge and experiences, i.e. professional 
and academic qualification and managerial experiences. These expertise‟s criterias are 
relevant to identify an expert, are explained by the behavioural decision theory. 
 
However, most importantly, in both analysis i.e. fraudulent financial reporting and 
earnings management, professional qualifications are shown to be prevalent. Hence, 
suggesting that it is an important determinant in financial reporting quality. Therefore 
supports the behavioural decision theory that advance education is important, and 
provide answer to the first research question on the types of expertise that is relevant to 
the Malaysia corporate governance scenario. The results shows that in the Malaysian 
context, it is relevant to include education as a criteria to measure the audit committee 
expertise with respect to professional qualification. 
 
Additionally, professional qualification also has a major role contributing to financial 
reporting quality, whereby knowledge of its value is critical to effective management 
and maximisation of human capital regardless of their innate ability or socioeconomic 
status. Hence support the resource dependence theory, that audit committee experts link 
the firms with external resources, such as expertise and experience. This is proven under 
both circumstances, i.e. under regulated circumstances (fraudulent financial reporting), 
as well as selection of accounting procedures and estimates that conform to GAAP 
(earnings management). The resource dependence theory views, directors as 
instruments in which organisations can use to deal with external dependencies (Dalton 
et al., 1999). Subsequently, resource dependency theorist emphasised the institutional 
function of structure, arguing that by increasing in size, and diversity, boards are able to 
assist firms to secure critical resources including prestige and legitimacy (Goodstein et 
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al., 1994; Pearce and Zahra, 1991). Thus, the findings are consistent with the IFAC
15
 
Proposed Framework for International Education Standards for Professional 
Accountant, Exposure Draft 2009 (IFAC, 2009). Where the Framework is targeted to 
meet the needs of International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) member bodies, but 
is relevant to a wide range of accounting education stakeholders, including, accounting 
faculty at universities, employers of professional accountants, professional accountants, 
prospective professional accountants, and anyone interested in the work of the IAESB. 
 
6.2 Implications 
The study has implications on theory, stakeholders and policy makers. There is also 
implication to private sector such as, for corporate boards in appointing audit committee 
members, and for auditors in developing strategies for communicating with audit 
committees and assessing their effectiveness (Beasley and Salterio, 2001).  
 
6.2.1 Implications for Theory 
The agency theory emphasise the need for directors to monitor the activities of the 
board. The agency relationship theorise that the presence of independent director with 
specific financial training and experience will reduce the incidence of management 
irregularities or fraud, where the underlying assumption is that the directors with 
accounting and/or finance background are more likely to be aware of the financial 
representation activities than directors without such background. In the case of agency 
theory, the findings failed to evidence that independent audit committees have a 
negative relationship with fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
                                                 
15 IFAC is a worldwide organisation for the accountancy profession founded in 1977, and comprised of 159 members and associates 
in 124 countries and jurisdictions. 
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On the other hand, agency theory provides rich conceptual foundation to explain that 
experiences, skills, and capabilities i.e. qualifications (Arthurs et al., 2009), as part of 
the governance process to oversee the top management and protect the interests of the 
shareholders. It is shown that the audit committee accounting experts have negative 
relationships with fraudulent financial reporting, as well as in the earnings management, 
as theorised by the agency theory. Thus, support earlier study by Barney (1991), human 
capital with firm‟s specific skills and capabilities have potential to turn intangible 
resources into sources of competitive advantage.  
 
The study shows support that additional theory is needed to explain board of directors‟ 
expertise and experience, other than the agency theory that is almost grounded in prior 
literature within the accounting domain (such as Menon and Williams, 1994; Rager, 
2004; Piot, 2004). Assumptions made in agency theory about individualistic utility 
motivations resulting in principal-agent interest divergence may not hold for all 
managers (Davies et al., 1997), such as the independence of audit committee as shown 
in the analysis. Furthermore, results in Nicholson and Kiel (2007) indicate that high 
monitoring alone is no guarantee of corporate performance, eventhough Peasnell et al. 
(2005) noted that outside directors act as a measure of board monitoring that contribute 
towards the integrity of financial reporting.  
 
Therefore, focusing on the monitoring aspect only, agency theory appears to discount 
the impact of other board functions, eventhough agency theory supports the role of 
board of directors for monitoring and control (Daily et al., 2003). Hence, combining 
two other theories to explain the monitoring functions of the board as well as the 
composition of expertise of the boards (from the resource dependence theory and 
behavioural decision theory), with agency theory seemed appropriate and complements 
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prior studies such as Hillman and Dalziel (2003), Hillman et al. (2007) and Dalton et al. 
(1999), Arthurs et al. (2009) and Engel et al. (2010). Engel et al. (2010) lacks the 
explanation and support with the theoretical foundation in providing their types of 
expertise.  
 
The findings show RDT is prevalent in accounting or auditing domain, where there is 
evidence showing directors represented by audit committee experts, bridge firms with 
external resources such as expertise and experience. Where expertise and experience are 
identified as professional and academic qualifications and managerial experience, 
explained by BDT. Subsequently, contribute to the mainstream accounting literature 
that the RDT and BDT are vital in explaining situations where directors‟ expertise and 
knowledge are involved. Hence, explains that, the mere presence of independent 
directors as monitoring mechanism is insufficient. It is also important to explain and 
links the background and knowledge expertise the directors have that can be use to 
assist them in their functional role as audit committee members. Therefore, the expertise 
and experience that audit committees expertise acquired from outside the organisation, 
are relevant to be used as a measure of expertise. 
 
Resource dependence theory emphasise the institutional function of structure, 
maintaining that by increasing the size, and diversity of board membership, boards are 
able to assist firms to secure critical resources including prestige and legitimacy (Pearce 
and Zahra, 1991; Goodstein et al., 1994). This rationale is adopted to explain the need 
for independent audit committee members who are also professionally qualified experts. 
Hence, the theories complement each other, where the agency theory explains the 
monitoring role of the boards, and resource dependency theory explains the overall 
significant impact of board‟s expertise. Whilst the behavioural decision theory explains 
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the criteria that are relevant to identify an expert, i.e. based on his or her qualifications 
and work experience. Consequently, the role of corporate governance may go beyond 
protecting or distributing profits, but also moving towards gaining competitive 
advantage in knowledge, skills, and expertise towards financial reporting quality.   
 
6.2.2 Implication to Stakeholders 
Since qualification and experience proved to be important, stakeholders may consider 
qualification and experience of a person before appointing them as audit committee 
members. Currently companies must appoint at least a person with an accounting 
background as ruled out in MCCG 2007. Therefore, options should also be given to 
those with prior experience in senior managerial positions, and academically qualified 
person, among their audit committee members. Hence, strategic decision could be 
gained towards the objective of quality financial reporting, as stated by Castinas and 
Helfat (1991) that the key function of the board is to set broad strategic direction for the 
company and make major policy decisions. Where the expertise of the board is of prime 
importance, supported by Felo et al. (2003) that suggest having more than one expert in 
accounting or financial management on the audit committee may be beneficial to firms, 
and Barbadillo et al. (2007), managers‟ interest are represented in the board, where 
managers can impair the effectiveness of audit committee through the creation of 
management dependence audit committee when they are able to influence the decision 
making process of the board. As Rezaee (2007) pointed out, the effectiveness of 
financial advisors depend on their professional objectivity, independence, training and 
experience. Therefore, having qualified experts on the board, will improve effectiveness 
and help strengthen the governance and interanl control of the organisation, thus give 
more confidence to the stakeholders.  
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Legislators or policy makers, such as the Securities Commission, may provide 
incentives and encouragement to directors of listed companies in pursuing tertiary 
education. It is an advantage for firms in developing and protecting themselves for 
having directors with specific skills and capabilities, whereby these skills have potential 
to turn into sources of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991), such as quality financial 
reporting. Furthermore,  Barbadillo et al. (2007) suggest that regulators might persist in 
searching for ways to guarantee that management will not be able to limit the control 
function of audit committee. Subsequently, board of directors should be comprised of 
members who do, in concert, fill the separate roles such as directors offering local 
expertise, training and succession (Dalton et al., 1999).  
 
In addition, since it takes time to train and accumulate human capital, in particular those 
with higher education (Li et al., 2009). The government or organisation should facilitate 
more efficient allocation of human capital by resorting relevant trainings and forms of 
incentives. So that, in the future, there will be more qualified and experienced directors 
for firms to consider as their directors.  
 
The study shows that tertiary education at postgraduate level has an association with 
financial reporting quality. Therefore  pursuing tertiary education might be useful and 
value added to directors‟ qualification. As proposed by IFAC (2009), this could increase 
public trust and improve the quality of the accounting profession. In addition to that, 
World Bank (1982) finds that education is the single most important key to poverty 
alleviation and tertiary education increases income from 82% to 300% in WEI 
countries. Additionally, MIA could encourage their members to increase their 
knowledge and education, by working with allies such as universities that offer 
postgraduate courses with CPE points.   
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Finally, human capital is the core production input of a public accounting firm, an 
expertise intensive and labour intensive service organization. Thus, a way to improve an 
auditor‟s professional competence and skill, are through the CPE that are consistent 
with practical matters and specific firm needs (Chen et al., 2008). Supported by (Pitelis, 
2009) that one needs prior knowledge, including the very capacity to obtain knowledge, 
for things to be implemented and applied.  
 
6.2.3 Implication for Researchers 
For researchers, the findings suggest that professional and academic qualification are 
associated with financial reporting quality. Hence, future studies may consider 
qualification as input factors to consider as experts. Other than that, researchers could 
consider other areas of expertise, other than accounting that might have an association 
with financial reporting quality. Such as prior studies that had considered other field or 
profession, such as lawyers as other professional expertise, and suggested having more 
than one expert in accounting or financial management on the audit committee may be 
beneficial to firms. 
  
6.3 Limitations of Research   
6.3.1 Sample   
The study has a number of limitations when evaluating the results. Firstly, in the fraud 
sample, the relative infrequency of financial reporting fraud is fairly small, only 28 
firms from approximately 900 public Malaysian firms had been discovered (at the time 
of data collection) to have engaged in fraudulent financial reporting under the strict 
selection of standards the study had set. This number of transgressive firms resulted in a 
matched pair sample of 112 firms in total. Data limitation is considered consistent or 
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sufficient for the analysis, as other studies of similar method had shown to face 
limitation of data too. Relative infrequency of fraudulent financial reporting sample 
fairly small, consistent with studies conducted in the US, where it reported only 65 
fraud firms were found among the 9600 US public companies. Even though the matched 
pair design is relatively powerful, consistent with prior, but must be carefully 
interpreted for generalisation (Zhao and Chen, 2008). Thus, findings is limited because 
of the small sample and generalisation should be made with careful consideration, 
especially on developed countries with high investor protection, less family ownership, 
high reliance on public debt, less concentrated and no pyramidal ownerships, because 
the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders‟ wealth is less (Saleh et al., 2007). 
 
6.3.2 Corporate Annual Reports 
The study focuses on corporate annual reports, consistent with many prior studies where 
directors information in the annual reports and is considered under voluntary disclosure. 
And such disclosures do not mean that they are credible or reflecting the true state of 
affairs of the company (Ho and Wong, 2001).   
 
6.4 Recommendations For Future Research 
The mainstream research world view has produced benefits for the conduct of 
accounting research with its insistence on public, intersubjective tests and reliable 
empirical evidence. But, this has limited the type of problems studied, the use of 
research methods, and the possible research insights that could be obtained (Chua, 
1986).  
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6.4.1 Other Expertise 
Future research can expand in finding the field of expertise or professional recognition 
other than accounting, and how they could contribute to the financial reporting quality 
of the organisation. Further investigation could be examined if professional recognition 
that are related to the nature of the business or their experiences in related field, that 
actually help in achieveing the quality of financial performance. Consistent with Goh 
(2009), audit committee with greater non accounting financial expertise and more 
independent boards are more likely to remediate material weaknesses in a timely 
manner. Therefore, role of non accounting financial experts shall be further researched 
to investigate their contribution in financial reporting.  
 
6.4.2 Academic Qualification 
The research can be extended in examining academic qualification in more depth, rather 
than just a general proclaimation of postgraduate courses. Subsequently, this is in 
similar direction with the Exposure Draft 2009 by the IAESB on the Proposed 
Framework for International Education Standards for Professional Accountant (IFAC, 
2009).  The study shows that there are many field or discipline that directors had 
attended or acquired academically and professionally. Further research on these fields 
will help to understand directors behaviour and effectiveness better, in terms of their 
contribution to financial reporting quality. Furthermore, further studies may substantiate 
which discipline actually reflects the true contribution towards the companies‟ 
performance.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
From prior literature the study draws upon three theories to provide the underlying 
foundation to build the hypotheses. Firstly, the agency theory provides the framework to 
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represent the audit committee as agents to the stakeholders and one of the governing 
mechanism in the organisation. Secondly, resource dependence theory views directors 
as the provider of external resources such as expertise and experience. And thirdly, the 
behavioural decision theory assists in determining the experts criterias on work 
experiences, and qualifications. The study includes two factors namely the academic 
qualifications and work experience into the model, and found significant results that 
provide contribution to the body of knowledge. Therefore, merely measuring audit 
committee financial expert with accounting professional qualification as prior studies 
had examined could be extended, and relevant to include academic qualifications in 
measuring an audit committee expert. Hence, experts could be determined from their 
work experiences, professional qualifications and academic qualification, as compared 
to the existing literature that use professional qualification only. The three theories 
complement each other with respect to audit committee expertise. Whereby, agency 
theory explains the function of audit committee experts as monitoring mechanism. 
While RDT explains that audit committee experts as resource provider to the 
organisation. And these resources are identified as expertise and experience, which are 
explained in depth by the BDT. The study extends earlier studies on audit committees, 
with the inclusion of other experts in the audit committee, have proven to give some 
significant impact towards financial reporting quality. Finally, the adoption of RDT and 
BDT, with agency theory in the accounting domain transcribe that, preparers of 
financial statements (agents) are not only responsible to report to the shareholders 
(principal) but, are also responsible to seek external expertise in order to produce quality 
financial reporting and mitigate the agency costs. 
